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A. No. 24263.

In Bank.

Dec. 7,

rrHURMAN TUCKER, JR., a Minor, etc., et
v. PHILIP LOMBARDO,

Appellants,

Weapons-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for insustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged
a gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, an instruction that the amount of care exercised by defendant
be
than would be necessary if he was not <uuHu<u,;
and that where the danger of
care to be used
be
jury that the standard of care required of defendant was that of ordinary care under the circumstances.
Id.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for
sustained
a boy who was struck by shot
from a
gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, it was proper
to refuse instructions which attempted to place the burden
of proof on defendant to show that he was not negligent.
Id.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for injuries
sustained
a boy who was struck by shot discharged from
working at a skeet-shooting range, where the
court in its instructions to the jury first defined
and "ordinary care," stating that the amount of caution
in accordance with the nature of the act and the
circumstances, followed by an instruction wherein
See Cal.Jur.,
§ 8; Am.Jur.,
and Firearms, § 22 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: (1-4, 6, 8, 9, 11] Weapons,§ 3; [5]
§ 6; [7] Negligence, § 133; [10] Negligence, § 32;
§ 27.
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[6]
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it was stated as a matter of law that "a firearm is capable of
causing severe injury" and for that reason "defendant was required to foresee the possibility of injury and, to avoid it, to
exercise a degree of care commensurate with and in proportion
to the danger involved," the jury was clearly informed that
defendant was required to exercise a degree of care commensurate with and in proportion to the danger involved, and
use of the word "may" in another part of such instruction
could not have misled the jury in determining the quantum
of care required.
!d.-Civil Liability-Evidence.-In an action for injuries sustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged from a gun
while working at a skeet-shooting range, it is not error to
receive evidence of the rules, practices and customs of skeet
shooting, since they have a direct bearing on the question of
defendant's negligence though they do not of themselves
establish the standard of prudent conduct.
Negligence-Knowledge of Danger-Foreseen Consequences.Negligence is gauged by the ability to anticipate danger;
reasonable foresight of harm is essential and supplies the
criterion for determining whether negligence exists in a particular case, but one is not required to foresee every possible
injury or anticipate against dangers it is not his duty to avoid.
Weapons-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for injuries sustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged
from a gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, the trial
court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa
loquitur where it was at least arguable that the injury resulted
from the boy's own negligent action or from failure of the
skeet-range owners to provide a reasonably safe working area
for him.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Applicability of Doctrine.Applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine depends on
whether it can be said, in the light of common experience, that
the accident was more likely than not the result of defendant's
negligence; where no balance of probabilities in favor of negligence can be found, the doctrine does not apply.
Weapons-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for injuries sustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged
from a gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, it was
not error to refuse to give plaintiffs' requested instruction
that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent where the subject of contributory negligence was properly covered in instructions defining the term, and where there was evidence from

[5] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence,
§ 23 et seq.
[7] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 123; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 295.
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which the jury could have found that the boy was guilty of
contributory negligence.
[9] !d.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for injuries
sustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged from
a gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, it was not error
to give, at defendant's request, instructions on the question of
assumption of risk where there was evidence from the circumstances of the boy's work and his knowledge of skeetrange practice that would support a finding that he had
voluntarily assumed the risk of his employment.
[10] Negligence-Assumption of Risk.-The doctrine of assumption of risk is not limited to an action by an employee against
his employer because of injuries suffered in the course of
employment.
[lla, llb] Weapons-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action
for injuries sustained by a boy who was struck at a skeetshooting range by shot discharged from a gun while operating
shielded apparatus for the ejection of "clay birds" or targets, it
was not error to give, at defendant's request, an instruction
that it is the duty of an employer to furnish his employee a
safe place to work and that defendant, if exercising ordinary
care himself, was entitled to assume that the boy's employer
had furnished the boy a safe place within which to work and
that defendant could further assume that the boy would reasonably use the protection afforded him by the employer, where
defendant was entitled to rely on the assumption that the
owners of the skeet range had obeyed the law and had exercised
reasonable care toward him and toward persons working on
the range through having the range in reasonably safe condition, he having testified that he did not know and had no
reason to assume that any shot fired from designated stations
would enter the place where the boy was working.
[12] Negligence-Anticipating Negligence of Others.-Every person who is exercising ordinary care has a right to presume
that every other person will perform his duty and obey the law.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William P. Haughton, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries.
defendant affirmed.

Judgment for

Madden & McCarry for Appellants.
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Gerold C. Dunn and Henry F. Walker
for Respondent.

in the (~ontrol
binl 's release. In skeet shooting, the gunner
' at the
line and calls "
command the operator in the control house presses the button
which releases the bird in the
machine.
while
in the high
was struck
shot
from a gun held
number 8
the skeet range.
eye.
The range where the accident occurred
in a half circle. Station number 1 was at the
nnmber 7 was at the low house, and the
stations formed a semi-circle arching to the south.
number 8
located at the
of
from station Jmmber 1 to station number 7,
vvas about
feet to the east of the
house. \Vhen
the bird was released from the
house for a gunner at
of
would be
the
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was
east wall and was 7 inches
and
was shielded
metal
outer wall. The
machine -vvas mounted
inches back from the
shelf which extended
of the
house. From the
of this shelf
rear or west wall of the house was
that in operating the trap
bird in the machine and cock it
pulling down a
then he would
back to the wall behind him so as
of the
lever. After
to be clear of the upward
the
in the control house released the
forward toward the machine and reload it. There
was no communication between the
house and the conand
would step forward to reload without
whether a gun was fired at the released bird. While
he could hear the
of a gun if there was not too much
from the lever
he could not tell from which
or at what bird it was fired.
Defendant Lombardo was
a
over-and-under
with which he was familiar. He had shot skeet
once or twice previously. Standing in
"
at station number 8, he looked toward the
"
as the
for the operator, and waited
the
bird
emerge. He testified that he raised his gun and fired
house. A
as the bird was approximately 2 feet from the
second or two later defendant heard
"holler" and saw
him come out of the high house.
testified that after the bird had been
forward to load the machine; that he was
for one of the birds stacked on the shelf
the machine
; that he
when he was struck by some pellets from the
was thrown against the wall and his face was
One
of the pellets caused a double perforation of his right eye,
which was subsequently removed.
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Defendant introduced photographs of the high house showing perforations resembling shot punctures in the corrugated
metal around the opening. The operator of the control
house testified that when the boys first started to work in
the high house, they were told to stand back after putting
the target in the trap machine; that he knew that shot had
come before into the high house through the opening and that
he had talked to the boys, including Tommy, about it but he
did not remember whether he had so warned Tommy that particular morning. 'rommy testified that he had never noticed
the shot marks and indentations on the metal around the
opening in the high house, and that while he was working
there no shot had ever before come through the opening.
Mrs. Ruth, coowner of the range with her husband, testified
that she had not been aware that shooters had hit the high
house though she admitted that she had seen the puncture
holes on the metal around the opening and that they were
"painted over." Defendant testified that he had never been
inside the high house; that he knew that when shot was
discharged from a shotgun, it spread out into a pattern but
he did not know what the area of spread might be; and that
he assumed that the shot would not go into the high house.
He further testified that in talking to Mrs. Ruth immediately
after the accident, she said "we know it is not your fault"
and the ''boys are often looking out the windows and they
have been warned about that."
[1] At defendant's request, the court gave the following
instruction: ''You are instructed that the duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff in this case was to exercise ordinary
care, that is the care that would be exercised by a reasonably
prudent person in the same or similar circumstances. In this
particular instance, however, the defendant was possessed
of and using a firearm and a firearm is capable of causing
severe injury. For that reason the defendant was required
to foresee the possibility of injury and, to avoid it, to exercise
a degree of care commensurate with and in proportion to the
danger involved, and, in the exercise of ordinary care, the
quantum or amount of care exercised may be greater than
would be necessary if he was not handling a loaded weapon.
This is but another way of saying that the amount of care to
be exercised by a reasonably prudent person will vary with
the circumstances, and where the danger of injury is greater
the amount of care to be used may be great." (Emphasis
added.)
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This instruction correctly informed the jury that the
standard of care required of defendant was that of ordinary
care under the circumstances. (Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d
325 [287 P.2d 7]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44
Cal.2d 310 [282 P.2d 12] .) But plaintiffs attack the use
of the permissive word "may" as diluting the established
quantum of caution required of a person handling a loaded
firearm. They claim that the instruction thereby injected a quantitatively false element into the jury's delibera·
tions and left the jury without a proper appreciation of the
controlling rules for judging defendant's conduct; and that
they did not waive the error because of a ''failure to request
an instruction" which correctly recited the high degree of
caution required to meet the test of ordinary care in the use
of firearms. (Sexton v. Brooks, 39 Cal.2d 153, 158 [245 P.2d
496] .) [2] With reference to this latter point, it should be
said that the instructions which plaintiffs did propose upon the
subject were incorrect and were properly refused because
they attempted to place the burden of proof upon defendant to
show that he was not negligent. (Jensen v. Minard, supra, 44
Cal.2d 325, 328-329.)
[3] While the challenged instruction is not a model, it
must be read with the other instructions and in the light of
the circumstances, in determining whether there was any
prejudicial error. It was only one of a series of instructions
given on this phase of the case. Thus, the trial court first
defined 'negligence" (BAJI 101), and then stated that it was
"not an absolute term, but a relative one," so that "in deciding whether there was negligence in a given case, the conduct
in question must be considered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances" (BAJI 101-A). Next, the court defined
"ordinary care" (BAJI 102) and amplified that standard as
follows: "Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by the
ordinarily prudent person varies in direct proportion to the
danger known to be involved in his undertaking, it follows
that in the exercise of ordinary care, the amount of caution
will vary in accordance with the nature of the act and the
surrounding circumstances. To put the matter in another way,
the amount of caution involved in the exercise of ordinary care
increases or decreases as does the danger that reasonably
should be apprehended." Then followed the challenged instruction concerning the application to the use of firearms.
In the challenged instruction it was stated as a matter of
law that "a firearm is capable of causing severe injury" and

situation also has
defendant did
to the
on this range.
house showing how it had been
with shot indicate that defendant's shooting in that direction
from station number 8 was precisely what was
him. The skeet
testified, without
that because the
of a shot from station number
increased as the bird approached the
it was
and in accordance with
rules for the shooter to point his gun at the high house and
fire
upon the bird 's emergence therefrom.
[ 4] There was no error in receiving evidence of the
and customs of skeet shooting. They have a direct
uc.:cuu"' on the question of negligence even though
not
of themselves establish the standard of prudent conduct.
(Fowler v.
System Transit Lines, 37 Cal.2d
68
P.2d 339] ; Hargrave v. Acme Tool & Testet· Co., 125 Cal.
App.2d 34, 39 [269 P.2d 913] .) Defendant did not
and so far as the evidence
had no
that there was any likelihood of
anyone
in the direction of the high house.
[5] It is an elementary principle that negligence is
the
to anticipate danger. '' [R] easonable
essential to the
of negligence, and
the criterion for determining whether it exists in a
case, and reasonable
of harm is the fundamental
basis of the law of
. On the other
oeeur, or
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Accordingly, plaintiffs' proposed instructions, which stated
unqualifiedly that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, were properly refused. (Burr v. Sherwin Williams
Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 692 [268 P.2d 1041].)
[8] Likewise the court did not err in refusing to give
plaintiffs' instruction on contributory negligence. It read:
"You are instructed that plaintiff Tommy Tucker was not contributorily negligent and you must find against the defendant
upon that issue.'' Plaintiffs insist that under any view of the
evidence Tommy could not have been negligent; but according to his own testimony, he moved forward to reload the trap
machine as soon as the bird had been released.
The subject of contributory negligence was properly covered
in the instructions. The court defined contributory negligence
(BAJI 103), set forth the various issues to be determined
in relation to whether there was contributory negligence
chargeable against Tommy ( BAJI 113), and declared that a
child is not held to the same standard of conduct as an adult
(BAJI 147). It appears that there was evidence from which
the jury could have found that Tommy was guilty of contributory negligence: He had worked some three months on
the skeet range and several times in the high house; he reasonably should have seen the peppered indentation marks on the
high house and the metal plates around the opening from
which the bird emerged; he had been warned of the danger
that shot might come through the opening; he knew that he
was not wearing any protective clothing or a face mask ; and
he was aware of the difficulty of shooting from station number
8. The jury could have inferred that Tommy had not stepped
back on loading the machine but remained in direct line of
the opening and so was hit, or that he had stepped back and
thereafter stepped forward prematurely. Accordingly, whether
Tommy was contributorily negligent was a question for submission to the jury rather than an issue for determination
as a matter of law through the giving of plaintiffs' requested
instruction.
[9] Nor did the court err in giving, at defendant's request, instructions on the question of assumption of risk.
These were BAJI 207 to 207-E. They included the distinction
between contributory negligence and assumption of risk
(BAJI 207-0), the declaration that the person's "age, experience and capacity along with all the other surrounding
circumstances as shown by the evidence" should be considered (BAJI 207 -D), and the statement that the "plaintiff
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did not assume the risk of any injury that could have come
to him only through the negligence of the defendant" (BAJI
207 -E). Here there was evidence from the circumstances of
Tommy's work in the high house and his knowledge of skeet
range practice which would support a finding that he had
voluntarily assumed the risk of his employment. [10] Contrary to plaintiffs' position, the doctrine of assumption of risk
is not limited to an action by an employee against his employer because of injuries suffered in the course of employment. (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 161162 [265 P.2d 904]; see also Warnke v. Griffith Co., 133 Cal.
App. 481, 494 [24 P.2d 583] .)
[lla] Finally, there was no error in giving, at defendant's
request, the following instruction: "You are instructed that it
is the duty of an employer to furnish to his employees a
safe place for them to work. You are further instructed that
defendant, Philip Lombardo, if exercising ordinary care himself, was entitled to assume that plaintiff's employer had furnished to plaintiff a safe place within which to work and he
could further assume that the plaintiff would reasonably use
the protection afforded to him by the employer." Plaintiffs
argue that this instruction was improper in that it relates
only to a duty owed by an employer to an employee as to
safety regulations (Lab. Code, §§ 6401-6402; Douglas v. Maloney, 105 Cal.App.2d 284, 286 [233 P.2d 59]; Neuber v.
Royal Realty Co., 86 Cal.App.2d 596, 619 [195 P.2d 501]),
and can have no pertinence to the issues between the parties
here. [12] But every person who is exercising ordinary
care "has a right to presume that every other person will
perform his duty and obey the law." (Hosking v. Danforth,
1 Cal.App.2d 178, 181 [36 P.2d 427]; see also Giovannoni v.
Union Ice Co., 108 Cal.App. 190, 195 [291 P. 461] .) [llb] Accordingly here, defendant was entitled to rely upon the assumption that the owners of the skeet range had obeyed the
law and had exercised reasonable care toward him and toward
persons working on the range through having the range in
reasonably safe condition. Apparently the jury accepted defendant's testimony that he did not know, and had no reason
to assume, that any shot fired from the designated stations
would enter the high house. The jury therefore probably concluded that defendant had done exactly what he was supposed
to do in firing from station number 8 and had violated no
duty of care in so doing. The issues involved were fairly

the reasons
therein
in the case at bar and

a new trial.

